
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# A Course In Game Theory (MIT Press)





## Synopsis

A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

#### **Book Information**

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### **Customer Reviews**

This text is a solid introduction to game theory for mathematical economists at the graduate level (but apparently logicians love it, too). In principle, the book could be read by someone without any prior knowledge of game theory, but I would strongly advise such a reader to spend some time on a less "dry" text (such as Kreps's "A Course in Microeconomic Theory") before (or at least while) taking up this one. The authors (like Myerson's "Game Theory" and unlike both Kreps and Fudenberg and Tirole's "Game Theory") cover both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory, with a nice balance. Two topics not covered in other major texts are "Complexity Considerations In Repeated Games" (Chapter 9) and "Implementation Theory" (Chapter 10). The implementation theory chapter is a wonderful introduction to the topic, but is unfortunately limited to the perfect information case (mechanism design under imperfect information is covered by both

Fudenberg-Tirole and Myerson.) The only application of game theory to which the authors devote considerable space is bargaining (those who know the authors won't be surprised!) - and its treatment could have been a little less abstract. In sum, it is a very good book that is not dominated by (nor dominates) any of its competitors cited above. If I were to teach a graduate game theory course, I would probably adopt it as the major text and supplement it with papers and parts of the other books.

This was one of the first books I read in Game Theory, and definitely the hardest. Those who want a gentle introduction to the concepts of modern game theory might do better with a simpler text such as Gibbons. That said, there is no substitute for quality. The depth of analysis is entirely necessary to get to the meat of the theory. Osborne and Rubinstein write extremely well, softening the blows of some of the more complicated concepts. Their own substantial publication records in the Game Theory literature do much to recommend their version of analysis over others.

I agree with a previous review that this book is not good for individuals. Solutions to the excersizes are only available to educators. If the book is assigned for a class and the teacher has access to the solutions and can coach the student through the excersizes this is probably a great book because of it's depth. It is probably also a good reference book for those already familar with the subject. However if you are like me and were looking for a strong book that will help a motivated individual learn game theory this book is not for you. I have tried many of the excersizes and I am still not positive that I my answers are correct. The material in the book is very complex but accessible, that is not the problem. The problem is the lack of development because I can not go over my answers to the excersizes and see what I did right and what I did wrong...

This is one of the best books ever written on game theory. I originally used it for my first year PhD microeconomics course as a reference and found it immensely helpful. Nowadays I still refer to it now and then during research. The authors also give excellent explanations of the economics, not just the math. A must have on the shelf of an economic theorist. You can find electronic copies of the book and the solution manual on the authors' website: http://books.osborne.economics.utoronto.ca/. The authors also maintain a very comprehensive errata for all printings of the book: http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/cgt/.

Ten years after this good came out, Osborne wrote An Introduction to Game Theory, a more

comprehensive and focused book that also takes a more leisurely pace and provides more concrete problems. Some have said that this book is better suited to graduate students, while "An Introduction" is more appropriate to undergrads. Speaking as someone who's taken game theory at both an undergraduate and graduate level, I don't see any advantage to this book in either context. It is concise, yes, but it is also dense and suffers from the authors' disagreements over several fundamental issues. If you are looking for an advanced textbook in game theory, then I'd strongly recommend Ken Binmore's recent effort, Playing for Real. It's wide-ranging and rich in challenging problems.

The authors assume that you are quite familiar with game theory. Concepts and complex notations are just shortly introduced, discussions of varied topics often ended up quickly. Almost no motivation. Not suited for beginners. I would recommend the authors to write a more complete one, in which every step and each reasoning are clearly explained, and suited for a wider audience, while maintaining the same level of difficulty. After all, a book, to be a book, should be â œreadableâ •. But you may find the book a little boring if you to seat in the library reading it in details. Rather, it is written in a reference style.

The book provides numerous excercises but solutions are onlyavailable to course instructors. I.e. the book is worthless for autodidactics.

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